Over the past decade, the plights facing the U.S. public education system have drawn much attention and have been widely documented. This attention has focused predominantly on the growing dropout crisis in U.S. high schools Legters 2001, 2004; MacIver et al. 2003; Swanson 2004) , the widening achievement gap within U.S. public schools between minority and low-income students and their more advantaged counterparts (Braswell et al. 2001; O'Sullivan et al. 2003; U.S. Department of Education 2003) , and the international disparity in achievement results between the United States and some other developed nations, particularly in the middle grades (Beaton et al. 1996; Schmidt et al. 1999) . As these problems have been brought further into the spotlight, the pressure to fix them has continued to mount. Yet, despite wideranging efforts and significant financial investment, the problems persist, and as the pressure continues to build, the type of reforms being brought into consideration have grown bolder, encompassing not only ideas for adjusting the current system but also proposals for changing the very nature of the system itself. One such fundamental reform is the idea of privatizing the public education system.
While attempts at privatization are relatively new and few in practice, they Electronically published March 12, 2009 have drawn a disproportionate amount of publicity, as they represent a striking challenge to the traditional role of government as the monopoly provider of free public education to those who cannot afford alternatives. Privatization proponents have theorized that the bureaucratization of the education system is at the heart of its failure and a main cause of the poor performance in many public school districts and that privatization would provide more efficient administration and use of resources, as well as greater innovation and improvement in the provision of services arrived at through competition in an open market (Chubb and Moe 1990; Peterson 1999) . Although new and controversial as a reform in education, the underlying theories, in fact, stem from the very fundamentals of traditional capitalist economic doctrine, going back to the core of Adam Smith and The Wealth of Nations (1776 Nations ( /2000 . The basic ideas of removing government interference in the field of education and allowing the natural free market forces such as competition to provide the public consumer with the best possible education services are in a sense traditionally American, finding support from the preeminent American economist of the twentieth century, Milton Friedman (1995) . However, the idea of privatizing the public education system has proven quite controversial to many in what has been a traditionally liberal arena.
Philadelphia as a National Proving Ground
The controversial aspect of privatization has thus meant limited opportunities to put its theories into practice. However, with a struggling urban public school system under a conservative state government, Philadelphia made for an ideal site to introduce privatization on a larger scale. The Philadelphia City School District, serving over 200,000 students, is one of the largest urban school districts in the United States. Poor academic performance, combined with the city's dependence on the state for assistance in paying off the school system's debts, laid the groundwork for a 2001 state takeover of the school system. Tension between the city district and the state VAUGHAN BYRNES is a researcher at the Center for Social Organization of Schools at Johns Hopkins University, where his work has focused on the evaluation of education policy and intervention programs. His main area of interest is research methodology, including the selection and implementation of appropriate research designs and statistical analyses. He received his degree in research methodology and statistics from the London School of Economics after having previously studied at McGill University. Since 2008, he has also held a position as research associate at Queen's University, where he has consulted on projects in the area of health sciences education.
had grown in the late 1990s under Superintendent David Hornbeck (Maranto 2005) . By 1998, the state had set the stage for future takeover when Republican Governor Tom Ridge, supported by a Republican-controlled state legislature, passed Act 46, permitting the state takeover of any school district in financial and/or academic distress. This legislation was furthered in 2000, with Act 16, putting Philadelphia and 10 other school districts on notice that they would be taken over by the state within three years should they fail to improve the academic standing of their students. Shortly thereafter, Superintendent Hornbeck announced his resignation. In 2001, Governor Ridge hired Edison Schools, the nation's largest for-profit educational management organization (EMO) to review the district's operations and present a proposal for restructuring Philadelphia's educational services. Later in that same year, Mark Schweiker, who replaced Ridge as governor in Pennsylvania, announced a plan for a state takeover of the Philadelphia City School District, based largely on the Edison proposal and calling for the privatization of many of the districts schools, along with many of the services traditionally provided by the school district.
The controversial nature of privatizing the schools led to strong reactions from the public, however, including student, teacher, and community groups. Their reaction gave the city's Democratic mayor, John Street, the political leverage to negotiate a better deal with the state, but, in the end, the deal was one that would still see the privatization of many of the district's schools. In 2002, the Philadelphia School Board was replaced by the School Reform Commission (SRC) with a five-member board; three members were appointed by the governor and two by the mayor, assuring that the SRC would favor the state's policies. The SRC then assigned 45 of the district's lowest-achieving schools to the management of education management organizations (EMOs). This number was substantially lower than in the original proposal and, similarly, the scope of privatization was also limited. Unlike in the more commonly conceived voucher system, parents were not given the freedom to choose their children's schools, and the EMO-run schools continued to draw their student populations from local neighborhoods. Still, the intervention in Philadelphia represented the largest single experiment in the privatization of public schools in the United States, and EMOs were given control over the hiring of administrative staff and classroom curriculum and pedagogy.
The SRC went even one step further beyond a simple experiment in privatization and introduced not one but several external service providers to create a competitive market environment. Edison received most (20) of the 45 schools, while two other for-profit EMOs, Victory and Chancellor Beacon, received five schools each. Two nonprofit EMOs, Foundations and Universal, received five and two schools, respectively, and, finally, two local universities, Temple and the University of Pennsylvania, were given the management of five and three schools, respectively. A further 16 schools, originally designated for new management, were allowed to continue with their ongoing reform efforts as they had shown substantial improvement in the years leading up to the state takeover. Four more schools were designated to become charter schools that would have freedom from some of the regulations that apply to the district's other schools.
Those schools left under the care of the district did not stay with the status quo. Paul Vallas, the ex-CEO of the Chicago public schools, was hired as the new superintendent of the Philadelphia School District. Vallas immediately introduced a wide array of reforms district-wide, including a mandated core curriculum in mathematics, reading, and English language arts, with coherence across grade levels; pacing guides; benchmark assessments administered every six weeks; district and regional coaches for teachers; professional development for teachers; the addition of content leaders for each major subject at each school; improved hiring practices for the district to recruit better candidates; the closing of some middle schools and the conversion of many K-4, K-5, and K-6 schools into K-8 schools; and the adoption of a zerotolerance disciplinary policy by the district. Thus, even while the SRC was bringing in several new management organizations to experiment in privatization, the district itself was also undergoing a substantial change in direction and implementing its own brand of reforms. These reforms included assigning 21 of the lowest-achieving schools to be managed by the district's own Office of Restructured Schools (ORS). By the start of the 2002-3 school year, the educational landscape in Philadelphia was unlike any other in the country.
Research on Privatized Service Providers
The large-scale experiment in Philadelphia represents an important opportunity to research and evaluate the effectiveness of privatization in education. The need to do so is made even more important by the lack of conclusive research presented on the matter to date despite its high publicity level. While conservative proponents of the policy have founded their arguments on the strong rhetoric of classical economic theory, they have offered little in the way of empirical evidence to ground and support their theories (CER 2007; Finn 1991; Hill 1997a Hill , 1997b Hill , 1997c Hill , 1998 Peterson 2007) . This lack of scientific evidence is due in large part to few opportunities, with there being just over 400 privately managed schools across the country at the time of privatization in Philadelphia (GAO 2003) .
Where empirical studies have been done on different privatization models, the research has been quite mixed, with positive results for privatization in some cases and negative results in others (Ascher 1996; Edwards 1997; GAO 1996 GAO , 2003 MacIver and Stringfield 2000; Peeler and Parham 1994; Williams and Leak 1995) . John Chubb (chief education officer of Edison, Inc.) and Terry Moe's 1990 study is often considered a hallmark case linking higher student achievement to lower levels of bureaucratic organization, but the study's methods and validity have been brought into question (Sukstorf et al. 1993) . Similar to past research on privatization in general, the early studies on Philadelphia data have also been mixed, with studies by Johns Hopkins University (MacIver and MacIver 2006) and the RAND Corporation and Research for Action (Gill et al. 2007 ) both finding EMO schools to have achieved less than the other district schools but not significantly so in statistical terms, while Peterson and Chingos (2007) found statistically positive results among for-profit EMOs when compared to the rest of the school district but no differences among nonprofit EMOs.
Sample and Method
In this article, we use an interrupted time series design (Shadish et al. 2002) to analyze the effectiveness of the various education service providers in Philadelphia. This quasi-experimental design allows us to determine the effect of each management organization in two different ways. First, we are able to analyze each management type on its own by comparing the achievement performance of their schools both before and after assignment to their new management group. Second, we can then compare the trends of each management type, private versus public, against those of the other, to gauge the differential effects of one manager versus another.
The grant funding this study focused research on the 88 middle-grades schools in Philadelphia (most of these middle and elementary middle schools had a 6-8 or K-8 grade configuration). This meant that we were unable to include elementary schools, which account for nearly half of the EMO-managed schools and most of the ORS schools. However, the sample remains large enough to provide reliable estimates from which we can draw conclusions about the effects of the various managers in general, and it does include the entire population of middle schools, which were the focus of the funded study. We focus on the academic achievement of students and schools in the eighth-grade year at the end of the middle grades. The middle grades are where the achievement gap between disadvantaged minority students and their U.S. and international counterparts is at its widest (Beaton et al. 1996; Schmidt et al. 1999 ) and also where practitioners can start to identify the students who will later dropout and fail to graduate from high school (Balfanz et al. 2007 ). Data were not available for charter schools, eliminating that one management group from our analyses. Our analysis includes data taken from a 10-year time period, from the 1996-97 school year to the 2005-6 school year. This gives our models six years of trend line prior to the state takeover of Philadelphia and four time points observed after.
With 10 years of data surrounding the point of intervention, we are able to rule out several of the most likely threats to validity involved in a time series analysis. These include delays in the emergence of reform effects, which typically take from three to five years to realize at a decent level of implementation (Borman et al. 2003) ; initial effects caused by the publicity generated from the state takeover and privatization; or any short-lived effects due to the initial excitement of introducing a new reform in general. In addition, the comparison among multiple groups allows us to rule out history or testing as threats to internal validity, and the use of several pretest measures and multiple control variables highly correlated to the outcome help to rule out the threat of any differences between the groups as a cause for selection bias in the results. This last point is of particular relevance given that the EMO groups were given the lowest-achieving schools to reform. Analysis of the control measures also found that any changes in the student population over the 10-year period were consistent across both the district and EMO schools, further reducing the threat of selection bias.
Our control measures include variables for the percentage of minority students at a school, the percentage of students eligible for the Federal Free/Reduced Lunch Program (FRL), and whether a school was a K-8 or middle school. The outcome in our models was a school's mean scale score on the Pennsylvania System of School Assessment (PSSA) exam, and separate models were run for both mathematics and reading. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for our sample of schools just prior to the state takeover in school year 2002-3.
We used two-level multilevel models (Bryk and Raudenbush 2002; Snijders and Bosker 1999) to measure schools' growth curves over this 10-year period, where schools were the level-2 unit and their achievement growth was modeled over time at level 1. Our variables measuring schools' demographic compositions were also measured at each time point and modeled at level 1 in order to control for changes in school characteristics over time. The use of multilevel modeling is ideal for samples such as ours where the data are clustered, as it explicitly accounts for the interdependence of observations taken over time from within the same schools. Such autocorrelation violates the statistical assumptions of traditional regression modeling and is common to time series designs.
Analysis
Figures 1-6 graphically present the results of our multilevel models (a sample of the full model estimates are presented in app. A). Figures 1 and 2 compare the growth rates of those schools that remained under the district's manage- ment to those schools that were given over to an EMO. These are then followed with secondary analyses that compare the various management groups in greater detail. Figures 3 and 4 show the results from models that separated Edison from the other smaller EMOs hired by the state, while figures 5 and 6 present the results of models that separated for-profit EMOs from nonprofit ones. In both secondary sets of analyses, the ORS is broken out from the rest of the school district.
The individual points in the figures represent a management group's mean achievement scores across time, as per the results of our multilevel models, which controlled for schools' grade structures and population demographics, as well as for measurement error, and the unique variation associated with each individual school. Asterisks above an EMO point estimate represent a statistically significant difference from the district according to the results of our models, using a 95% confidence interval with a two-tailed test. In the first baseline year of 1996-97, this means that the schools later run by EMOs started at significantly different levels of achievement than did the schools later run by the district. In later years, this means a significant interaction between EMO status and the slope of the model, or that EMO-run schools experienced significantly different achievement growth rates than did the district-run schools. Along with the point estimates, trend lines have been su- perimposed for each management group to highlight their growth trends both before the state intervention and after, as per the interrupted time series design. By comparing the trend lines of a single group before the intervention to after, we can see if its growth rates rose, decreased, or remained the same after the new management group was introduced. Thus, scores from the spring of 2002 represent the final point of growth prior to state intervention; conversely, this is the initial starting point from which growth is measured for the posttakeover time period and the onset of new management. By comparing the trend lines of one management group to another, we can also evaluate the relative effects of one versus another. The slopes for each trend line are marked in the figures.
From figures 1 and 2, we first see that, prior to state takeover, all schools on average were making achievement gains from 1997 to 2002. We also see that all schools, district-run and EMO-run alike, improved even more rapidly after 2002. However, when we start to compare the relative differences between EMO-run and district-run schools after the takeover, we start to see two diverging patterns. The figures show that, prior to the state intervention, the "struggling schools" (originally designated for outside management) were actually gaining on the higher-performing district schools. This is evident from the higher slopes of their trend lines, which up until 2002 show that the achievement levels of the low-performing schools were actually converging with those of the higher schools. The higher growth rate of the targeted schools compared to the rest of the district reached statistical significance in reading by 2002, just prior to the state takeover, though not in mathematics, which, while nominally higher, were not statistically distinguishable. After the state When looking more specifically at individual management groups in figures 3 and 4, we see little difference between Edison and the other EMOs. The ORS trajectories, meanwhile, more closely resembled the higher gains of other district-managed schools, though their trajectories were not statistically distinguishable from those of other EMOs; given that this estimate is based upon a sample of only five schools, it should not be considered to be conclusive. The patterns are similar in figures 5 and 6, which compare the EMOs along profit versus nonprofit lines. Both for-profits and nonprofits grew at lower rates than did other district-managed schools, a result that differs from the Peterson and Chingos study (2007) , which found a positive effect of for-profit EMOs on achievement growth rates. While their study and ours are similar in methodological approach, as both attempt to compare each management group's preintervention growth to their post-intervention growth and then the differences between the two, our study makes use of five years of growth prior to intervention as a baseline for comparison, whereas theirs compares the four years of postintervention growth to only one year of pretreatment growth, the school year 2001-2. Using only one year of pretreatment growth for comparison leaves the causal inferences they draw open to several threats to validity, such as regression to the mean or selection maturation (Shadish et al. 2002) . This is especially so given the particularities of the 2001-2 school year in the Philadelphia School District, as the state takeover of the school board occurred in the middle of the school year, in January of 2002. Further, the effects of this historical event would not have been equal across all schools in the district but rather would have been greater for those schools facing outside management, as they were already aware of their possible fates prior to spring testing, meaning that principals already knew that they would likely be replaced and that many of the teachers who later transferred to other schools not on the takeover list would have already begun that process and filed their transfer papers. Thus, given the social and political upheaval surrounding the district at the time and those EMO schools in particular, the year of growth from 2001 to 2002 represents a particularly unreliable year from which to estimate preintervention trends. Our study, which included five years of growth prior to intervention, provides both a more reliable measure of preintervention trends from which to compare and results that are less vulnerable to threats of internal validity.
Discussion
That our main results echo those of other early studies on privatization in Philadelphia (Gill et al. 2007 ; MacIver and MacIver 2006) lends support both through replication and by triangulation of methodologies. Responses to these results from supporters of privatization have relied upon the fact that the EMO schools were given management of many of the lowest-achieving schools in the district. However, that is not likely to bias results in this study given the statistical control of several pretest measures (six time points), as well as the control for several other measures of student demographics and school structure. Furthermore, in our sample of middle-grades schools, five of the worst schools in terms of absolute levels of achievement prior to state intervention were those under ORS management, which began with achievement levels as low as those of the EMO schools and with equally disadvantaged student bodies (table 1) . That the ORS schools may have been the highestperformers of all groups postintervention further takes away the argument that the relative effectiveness of the district versus EMO management was due to pretreatment differences in achievement levels and student demographics. Given that the models also incorporate data up to four years past the date of intervention, it is also unlikely that the lack of positive results for EMO is due to early implementation problems or that it is too early to detect any treatment effects (Borman et al. 2003) .
Some EMO officials have argued that the district-wide gains have been a product of the competitive market introduced by the state takeover, thus mak-ing the introduction of EMOs a success, even if they themselves did not outperform the district schools, as their competition may have been the impetus for the district's reforms and improved achievement levels (Viadero 2006) . A competing theory is that the achievement gains seen district-wide are a result of the increased pressure upon school and district administrators from new national accountability measures imposed under No Child Left Behind (NCLB), which led them to implement their centralized and systemic curricular and staff development reforms (MacIver and MacIver 2006). As both NCLB and the privatization of the school district were introduced at roughly the same, it is empirically very difficult to separate the effects of the two and determine which one was more likely the cause of the district's gains.
There is one point, however, that gives us reason to doubt the competition theory, the lack of competitive environment at all that seems to have existed between the district and the EMOs. That many of the EMOs were sharing in the district's reforms suggests this (MacIver and MacIver 2006) , and studies based upon interviews and other qualitative methods have further described the relationships between the district and the EMOs as better characterized by cooperation than by competition (Christman et al. 2006) . The district and EMO schools were also not competing for students given that the 2002 changes did not include parental choice of schooling, which is usually considered an essential element of school competition. Again, because of their coinciding introductions, it is difficult to assert whether the district-wide gains were due to the introduction of private service providers or due to the introduction of federal accountability measures; there is some evidence that suggests the latter theory over the former. The lack of a competitive environment between the district and EMOs casts doubt on the notion that the introduction of varied service providers spurred the positive results that were seen in the district after 2002. Rather, it seems more likely that the large gains seen by the district were in response to the increased pressures under NCLB, and the centralized reforms it adopted in response, such as a coherent core curriculum, providing coaches and content leaders in the major subjects, improved hiring practices, and the restructuring of the some schools with the worst track records. As many of the EMOs made use of the district's curriculum and its benchmark tests and professional development, as well as experiencing the district's parallel K-8 conversions, they would also have benefited from the district's reforms, though to a lesser degree, making the effect citywide.
One area this study could not address was the issue of the funding provided to the various management groups. As one of the main arguments for the privatization of school districts is that the bureaucratization of public administration causes great inefficiencies, it is very important to then evaluate the academic performances of the management groups in the context of their relative funding levels. If the EMO results came at higher costs but were no better than those of the publicly run school district, then this would be considered as evidence against the theory that the publicly run administrations are less efficient. A similar situation exists in Baltimore, where Edison has run three schools and the high cost of its contracts has brought into question the cost effectiveness of privatization as a use of state funds (Abell Foundation 2005) . In the case of Philadelphia, it is known that, through funding agreements between the city and state, the EMOs received marginally increased per pupil funds than did the district schools (Christman et al. 2006) . Edison schools received the most extra funding, $881 per pupil above the regular district schools in the first year after takeover and $750 in years 2 and 3. Victory received $857 and $750, respectively; Foundations, $667 and $750; Universal $656 and $650; and Chancellor Beacon $650 and $100. The two universities, Temple and University of Pennsylvania, received $450 in extra funding per pupil per year. Within the district itself, ORS schools and the 16 schools removed from the takeover list received an additional $550 and $450 per pupil above other district schools. However, it is also known that EMO schools had less-experienced teachers and thus received fewer resources in terms of teacher salaries. However, given the lack of data on teacher salaries and without knowing how teacher salaries differed across schools, there is no way to know whether the total per pupil funding was greater or less in district schools or EMO schools. There are also several other streams of funding for which we do not have data, including outside grants from charities, foundations, and federal sources. Further, as this study in particular was based on a 10-year time span, the above-mentioned financial data would have had to have been available for that entire time period. Therefore, the financial context of the school privatization is an issue that we were unable to examine here, but it is an important detail of the story that bears further examination in future work if possible.
Another area that this study could not address was the performance of charter schools as an education service provider and school management choice. Charter schools are proving to be a popular choice as an alternative to failing urban public school systems (Hess et al. 2001) . However, the research on charter schools has similarly produced limited evidence as to their educational advantages (Hess and Moranto 2000; Miron and Nelson 2002; Murphy and Shiffman 2002; Wells et al. 1998; Zimmer et al. 2008) , and, given their growing popularity as a reform, more research on their efficacy is certainly required. NOTE.-EMO p education management organization; FRL p federal free/reduced lunch program.
* Statistically significant at the 10% level. *** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
